

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE UTILITY OF MAKING
FUNCTIONAL AREA 39
A BRANCH**

by

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December 1999

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20000417 160

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 1999		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE UTILITY OF MAKING FUNCTIONAL AREA 39 A BRANCH				5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Landy, Francis P. and Porras, Rene B.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>The purpose of this thesis is to suggest that it is time for Functional Area 39 (Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs) to become a branch. We hope to stimulate critical thinking on this issue and illustrate the demands that are presently being placed on the FA 39 community by utilizing the Spectrum of Conflict as a frame of reference.</p> <p>As experienced officers with a vested interest in the future of FA 39, we believe it is important to the future of the Functional Area to take a critical look at where it is and where it appears to be going. Our present degree of reliance on the reserves, we argue, is a sub-optimal long-term solution.</p> <p>Utilizing the Spectrum of Conflict as a model, we illustrate that conflict trends over the past twenty years show a significantly higher incidence of sub-state conflict, with no change in the foreseeable future. This suggests an increased need for soldiers with Special Operations Forces (SOF) related skills. By examining possible alternatives, we provide arguments and illustrate the merits of change.</p> <p>The findings of our analysis lead us to recommend that FA 39 become a branch within the U.S. Army. While it may appear that the organization is healthy, the threat environment and increased OPTEMPO necessitate a need for change.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Functional Area 39, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), Spectrum of Conflict, Special Operations Forces, Branch designation, OPMS XXI, Low Intensity Conflict, PSYOP and CA Reserve Components				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 118
				16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFI- CATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

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THE UTILITY OF MAKING FUNCTIONAL AREA 39 A BRANCH

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
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of


MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS (IRREGULAR WARFARE)

from the


**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
DECEMBER 1999**


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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to suggest that it is time for Functional Area 39 (Psychological Operations/ Civil Affairs) to become a branch. We hope to stimulate critical thinking on this issue and illustrate the demands that are presently being placed on the FA 39 community by utilizing the Spectrum of Conflict as a frame of reference.

As experienced officers with a vested interest in the future of FA 39, we believe it is important to the future of the Functional Area to take a critical look at where it is and where it appears to be going. Our present degree of reliance on the reserves, we argue, is a sub-optimal long-term solution.

Utilizing the Spectrum of Conflict as a model, we illustrate that conflict trends over the past twenty years show a significantly higher incidence of sub-state conflict, with no change in the foreseeable future. This suggests an increased need for soldiers with Special Operations Forces (SOF) related skills. By examining possible alternatives, we provide arguments and illustrate the merits of change.

The findings of our analysis lead us to recommend that FA 39 become a branch within the Army. While it may appear that the organization is healthy, the threat environment and increased OPTEMPO necessitate a need for change.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY	1
A. INTRODUCTION	1
B. HISTORY	3
C. CONCLUSION	15
II. DEFINING THE MISSION NICHE	19
A. INTRODUCTION	19
B. THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT	20
C. PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONAL TRENDS	23
D. FA 39 SKILLS: QUALITY, QUANTITY AND TIMELINESS .	29
1. Language Skills	32
2. Regional Focus	33
3. Political and Cultural Sensitivity	34
4. Operational Expertise	34
E. CONCLUSION	36
III. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ORGANIZE (OPTIONS)	39
A. INTRODUCTION	39
B. DEFINING "ORGANIZATION" AND "FUNCTIONAL AREA" ..	40
C. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS	46
1. Remaining the way we are (Status Quo)	46
a) Pro's	46
b) Con's	48
2. Eliminating FA 39 (The SF Option)	50
a) Pros	51
b) Con's	53
3. Expand the FA to include the FAO designation	57
a) Pro's	58
b) Con's	61
4. Evolve FA 39 to Branch Designation	64
a) Pro's	65
b) Con's	67
D. CONCLUSION	70
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR BRANCH DESIGNATION	73
A. INTRODUCTION	73
B. THE REVOLVING DOOR ISSUE	74
C. THE OPMS XXI FALLACY	77
D. MEETING THE THREAT/ PERSONNEL NUMBERS	78
E. THE SF BLUEPRINT	81
1. Background	82
2. The Birth of Special Forces Branch	88
3. The Similarities	93

F.	POSSIBLE NON-RATIONALE BARRIERS	95
1.	The Reserve Component Argument	95
2.	The Funds Argument	97
3.	The Concerned Stakeholder Argument	98
G.	CONCLUSION	99
LIST OF REFERENCES		101
DISTRIBUTION LIST		103

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The historical relevance of Functional Area (FA) 39 (Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs) can be traced to America's humblest beginnings. Maneuver Commanders have come to appreciate and rely on this non-lethal combat multiplier. The road to integration has been a bumpy one, and it has taken a long time to incorporate the FA 39 Battlefield Operating System (BOS) into everyday doctrine. Historically, FA 39 has suffered the ebb and flow of conflict build-up and post conflict draw down. PSYOP and CA have long fought the battle of survival against the conventional army and combat arms bureaucracy.

Adopted by the Special Operations Community, FA 39 received a windfall during the Reagan ERA. The creation of USSOCOM and the inclusion of FA 39 as part of the SOF community ensured its future survival and gave it a permanent home. As the Reagan ERA gave way to the Bush administration, many events would transpire that would change our lives. The fall of the Soviet Union has created a uni-polar world and with it, an increase in unconventional warfare and Low Intensity Conflict. This increase in guerrilla warfare and the relevance of information age technologies has served to validate the importance of FA 39. This validation is illustrated through two frames of reference: The Spectrum of Conflict, and the Mission Niche.

The threat environment, as demonstrated by the past twenty years, suggests that we need to be capable of operating in the Low Intensity Conflict environment. As defined by the Spectrum of Conflict this environment includes Peace Enforcement, Peace Keeping, Nation Assistance, and Humanitarian Assistance amongst others. While the Army needs to be capable of operating at the high end of the spectrum, our recent history and all evidence suggests that the conflict patterns will continue to focus at the low end of the spectrum. The complex, dynamic environment that exists at the low end of the spectrum requires specially trained unconventional soldiers with unique skills.

As a result of this tendency we have created soldiers with a special skill set (common to SOF forces) that includes language and cultural expertise, operational experience and regional awareness. The fall of the Soviet Union has created a demand for soldiers with this SOF skill set. While it may appear that we (as a community) are meeting mission requirements on the surface, the increase in OPTEMPO has placed a serious strain on the organization and an unhealthy reliance on the reserves. Added to this is the fact that the FA loses over one fourth of its trained officers per year back to their basic branch, never to return. This revolving door comes at great expense to the FA and the army at large. Bearing this in mind, it is time to consider some alternative

forms of organization. The alternative forms considered by this thesis include: eliminate the FA and have the duties absorbed by the Special Forces branch, the historical ties and shared SOF characteristics suggest this is reasonable; expand the FA to include the Foreign Area Officer designation, thus creating a super warrior diplomat; evolve the FA into a branch, or maintain the status quo. After careful consideration of the pros and cons of each option, we arrive at the recommendation to evolve the FA into a branch. While one could argue that all the options possess specific merits, the obstacles to be overcome in the alternative options create as many problems as they solve. They also fail to eliminate the basic problems regarding the threat and solving the revolving door argument. Maintaining the status quo is basically unacceptable because it forces the continuous reliance on the reserves. This conclusion is not based on a reluctance of the active duty to work with the reserves; quite the contrary, it is a reluctance to have the reserves shoulder an unfair share of the workload. In the final analysis the most logical step is to make the de facto branch (FA 39) into a legitimate branch.

By paralleling the experience of FA 39 with Special Forces we are able to demonstrate the uniquely similar circumstances that the two disciplines share. The evolution of Special Forces serves as an excellent blueprint for FA 39

branch designation based on these similarities. Many of the same political, structural, and parochial barriers existed for Special Forces, just as they do for FA 39. These barriers could easily be cause to dismiss our ideas; however, we maintain that just like in the case of Special Forces, it is in the best interest of the Army and the FA that these barriers be overcome.

I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

A. INTRODUCTION

The historical relevance of Functional Area (FA) 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs) can be traced to America's humblest beginnings. From the battle of Bunker Hill to operations in Yugoslavia, FA 39 soldiers or their predecessors have played a critical role in U.S. conflict's, in both high and low intensity environments. Maneuver commanders have come to appreciate and rely on this non-lethal combat multiplier, as much for its ability to save American lives and resources as those of our adversaries. The road to recognition has been a bumpy one. It has taken decades to incorporate this combat multiplier into army doctrine and standard operating procedures. Historically, FA 39 has suffered the ebb and flow of conflict build-up and post combat draw down. From its earliest employment, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs (PSYOP and CA) has suffered the fate of most post drawn down units, losing the battle of survival to the conventional emphasis.

As part of the Special Operations community, FA 39 received a windfall during the Reagan era. The creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the inclusion of FA 39 as part of the Special Operations

Forces (SOF) community ensured the future survival of this vital, but often underutilized asset. As the Reagan era gave way to the Bush administration, many significant events occurred that would change the functional area forever. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war has shifted our focus from a bi-polar world to a uni-polar one. This shift has brought with it an increase in unconventional warfare and low intensity conflict. This greening of guerrilla warfare and the relevance of information age technologies have served to illustrate the importance of the FA 39 skills. Once an underutilized combat multiplier, Functional Area 39 has now become overextended and under equipped.

There currently exists no evidence to support a change in the current operational pattern. As a matter of fact, all evidence suggests these trends will continue well into the future. This change in the global environment places a premium on FA 39 skills. Our challenge is to meet these demands head on and resist the patterns of the past. In order to meet and overcome these challenges the functional area, as an organization, must change and evolve to meet the challenges of the 21st century. As an organization we must continue to grow and flourish. FA 39 will face the dangers of the past if it fails to recognize that it's operational

utility is directly proportional to the level of support it can provide to the maneuver commander. In an effort to find a niche and secure the future of FA 39, we have perhaps lost sight of the continued need to evolve. This stagnation provides a direct threat to the future success of the functional area and it impacts directly on the quality of support it can provide. The present operational tempo virtually guarantees that PSYOP and CA operators will continue to support exercises and contingencies undermanned and under equipped. Faced with stagnation there is but one choice, which is to expand the organization to meet the needs of the Army, our officers and our soldiers. Following the example of Army Special Forces in the 1980s, it is time that FA 39 takes the next logical step in the evolution of its organization. FA 39 must move out of the shadows as a functional area and expand into a fully functioning non-accession branch.

B. HISTORY

This brief history of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs is designed to familiarize the reader with the evolution of Functional Area 39. It is in no way a full accounting, but rather a general overview of how the Functional Area got to where it is today.

FA 39 skills have played a vital role in virtually every conflict and contingency in U.S. history. Although FA 39 and their predecessors have a long history of supporting maneuver commanders, PSYOP and CA have not always been synonymous with each other.

Psychological Operations has been part of military strategy since armies first took up arms. The United States use of PSYOP has been no exception. As early as the battle of Bunker Hill the Colonial Army used leaflets encouraging the British soldiers to surrender. Since this humble beginning, the use of PSYOP and its forces has been sporadic and episodic. That is, until the revitalization of U.S. PSYOP forces in the 1980's. A force formerly used only during crises, allowed to fall in and out of various states of disrepair, has come of age and its success speaks volumes for the wise decision to revitalize the force.

"The ultimate objective of American Psychological Operations is to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and forces to take actions favorable to the U.S. and it's allies" (Goldstein, 1996, p.5). During WWI Psychological Operations, operations know as Psywar were given token recognition. The Army established the Psychological Warfare subsection of the G-2 in the War Department and the propaganda section of the G-2 in the

General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. The primary focus of these organizations was on tactical PSYOP and the production and dissemination of surrender appeals. Psywar existed to a lesser or greater degree in dropping leaflets on enemy positions. The primary means of dissemination was by balloon or airplane. Radios did not yet exist as a means of communication and loudspeakers were primitive and virtually obsolete. Between WW I and II no Psychological Warfare office existed within the War Department. Any and all lessons learned on Psychological Operations during the course of WW I were lost. By 1941 only one officer on the War Department staff had any previous Psywar experience. (Goldstein, 1996)

During World War II the majority of Psywar work took place at the theater level. At the direction of General Dwight D. Eisenhower the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) was stood up at Allied Force Headquarters and activated in North Africa in 1942. The branch was further expanded in 1944 to the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHEAF). The basic Psywar operation unit was the Mobile Broadcasting (MRB) Company. For the first time, a combination of public address systems, radios, monitoring sets, loudspeakers, typewriters, mobile printing presses, and leaflet bombs were

introduced into the field, much to the surprise of the conventional soldier. By the end of WW II five such units existed within PWD/SHEAF. After the war, however, Psywar staffs and units dissipated with the general demobilization. (Goldstein, 1996)

In June of 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. The Tactical Information Detachment was the only existing U.S. PSYOP capability, formed in 1947 at Fort Riley, Kansas, as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. Sent to Korea in the fall of 1950, the company served as Eighth Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the conflict. In order to conduct full-scale strategic operations, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group was established at Fort Riley. They were sent to Korea in July of 1951. The Group was designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations. The Group produced newspapers and leaflets, supervised a radio station network known as "voice of the United Nation" and produced more than two hundred leaflets per week. These leaflets were disseminated via aircraft and artillery shells. Although the Group made great strides in Psywar doctrine and techniques, it performed the same primary function as its WW II predecessor. The future framework, however, was being laid for strategic and tactical PSYOP techniques and

doctrine (i.e. the various uses of media and its appropriate level of application). (Goldstein, 1996)

In 1952 the Psychological Warfare Center was established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The center included: The Psychological Warfare School, the 6th Radio and Broadcasting Group, a Psychological Warfare board, and the 10th Special Forces Group. The mission of the center was to conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment employed in Psychological Warfare and Special Operations. Between 1952 and 1956 interest in Psychological Operations waned once again, and in 1956 the center was renamed the Special Warfare center. The loss of interest resulted in the erosion of PSYOP capabilities and by the early 1960's it was in terrible shape once again. (Goldstein, 1996)

When the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion was activated in Vietnam in 1965 it lacked a base of sufficiently trained PSYOP officers. The Army was forced, once again, to expand its PSYOP capability. By 1967 the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) was formed and serving in Vietnam. The Group consisted of four battalions, one in

each of the four Corps tactical zones established in Vietnam. The Group served under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office provided U.S. PSYOP policy guidance. The Group provided operational and tactical support via radio, magazine, and loudspeaker teams, both aerial and ground mounted. The Group provided broadcast and leaflet dissemination to the hamlet level. At the height of U.S. involvement the Army stationed PSYOP units at Fort Bragg, Germany, Panama, and Okinawa. These units were in addition to the 4th Group located in Vietnam proper. The additional units provided increased production and in some cases long-range high altitude leaflet dissemination capabilities. After the war, once again, the U.S. PSYOP capability would fall into a state of disrepair. By the mid 1970's all that remained in the active component was an ill equipped, inadequately staffed 4th Group at Fort Bragg. This organization was doomed to less than mediocrity for at least another ten years. (Goldstein, 1996)

With the election of Ronald Reagan and the birth of the "Reagan Doctrine" it was recognized that the U.S. PSYOP capability was allowed to atrophy to an unacceptable level. This realization stemmed from the Cold War and the fact that the U.S. was concerned that it was loosing the global

information war to the Soviet Union. The administration realized the importance of winning the public information campaign both at home and abroad. In 1983 President Reagan signed National Security Decision 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security". This decision set the wheels in motion to revitalize American PSYOP. "In 1984, the President directed DOD to rebuild its military PSYOP capability" (Goldstein, 1996, p. 30). This led to the DOD PSYOP Master Plan of 1985. The plan envisioned a framework for the fundamental improvement of DOD's capabilities to effectively perform worldwide PSYOP in peace and crisis, at all levels across the conflict spectrum. (Goldstein, 1996). The plan called for two hundred remedial actions to be implemented over several years. The act included two major initiatives needed to carry PSYOP forward; the need to develop Joint doctrine, and to staff the effort with talented, capable officers in sufficient quantity at the appropriate level. For the first time in over twenty years a Psychological Operations directorate existed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The PSYOP office at the office of the JCS level was expanded from a branch to a division (although later reduced). The Army staff created a Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs division. Among the Unified Commands, USSOUTHCOM

created a PSYOP detachment to augment its staff capability, and in 1987 when USSOCOM was created, it included a directorate for Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs (J-9). (Goldstein, 1996)

Civil Affairs on the other hand can be traced back to the Mexican American war, where General Winfield Scott (considered the "father of CA") promulgated General Order No. 20. General Order No. 20 proclaimed that, in exchange for their cooperation, Mexican civilians and their property would receive U.S. protection. Goods and services were to be paid for in cash and local leaders were afforded their due respect from U.S. troops. As a result, General Scott's advance on Mexico City had almost a total absence of guerrilla activity against his supply trains. By contrast, his peer, General Zachary Taylor who could not be bothered with such trivial details, was continually harassed by Mexican guerrillas. (Sandler, 1991)

Although CA was not officially established as an organization until WW II, the use of CA techniques or lack thereof benefited or haunted those who chose not to employ them. In the Civil War, Union General Benjamin F. Butler ended up with a \$10,000 price on his head as a result of his GO NO. 28. "It is ordered that henceforth when any female shall in word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt

for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded as a woman of the street plying her avocation."

(Sandler, 1991, p.38) Time and again, military leaders who failed to pay attention to the sensitivities of the civilian community paid the price in men and material.

Thirty years later soldiers found themselves paving the way for Cuban independence, cleaning up cities, restoring public health and encouraging elections. After the defeat of the Philippine insurrection, the U.S. Army found itself establishing local self-government, police forces, public health services, schools and a Philippine defense force. After WW I, under General John J. Pershing's mandate of "a just, humane and disinterested administration", the U.S. Army administered its first major military government of an enemy population by establishing the German Rhineland occupation. (Sandler, 1991)

WW II witnessed significant changes in U.S. CA policy. Secretary of war Henry Stimson convinced FDR (against his instincts) to activate the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division (CAD) and leave it under military control. FDR advocated civilian control of CA. On March 1, 1943 CAD was activated under Major General John Hildring. CAD personnel were trained at the University of Virginia's School of Government. These personnel soon found themselves facing a

host of problems in WW II Europe. These issues ranged from refugees, to the recovery and restoration of cultural treasures. Army Civil Affairs took up the military Governments of Germany, Japan, Austria, and Korea after the war. Their incredible success has spoken for itself as Germany and Japan have emerged as economic competitors. The lack of guerrilla warfare against American occupational troops speaks volumes for the utility of treating civilians and their property with respect.

The Korean experience paled in comparison to WW II Germany and Japan. In an environment where fertilizer and draft animals were more important than infrastructure, Korea proved a difficult CA environment. "U.S. Army Civil Affairs enjoyed the satisfaction, however brief, of governing the only communist capital, Pyongyang, to fall to the forces of freedom to date." (Sandler, p. 40)

The stated policy objective of winning the "Hearts and Minds" brought Civil Affairs to the public view like never before during the Vietnam War. A broad base of local public support would be necessary to seal a U.S. victory.

In Vietnam CA's greatest success came in the Central Highlands, "where CA troops worked closely with Special Forces in securing large amounts of terrain by winning the confidence of local tribes." (Sandler, p. 40) Civil Affairs

enjoyed many unsung successes in Vietnam where they initiated school building, well drilling, public health clinics, and the building of market roads and bridges. These successes were largely accomplished during the pacification period (1967-69), orchestrated by a CAPO; a CA PSYOP warfare officer assigned to each Special Forces A team. Three regular army CA company's shouldered the majority of the burden of CA duties throughout the war in Vietnam, the 2nd, 29th, and 41st. By 1971, however, all Special Forces protection duties were turned over to the Republic of Vietnam. Four years later, this effort collapsed in the face of a huge conventional armor assault by the Army of North Vietnam. (Sandler, 1991)

Following Vietnam, CA kept busy with civic action projects in countries like Central America, Indonesia, and Thailand. During Operation *Urgent Fury* CA soldiers were instrumental in feeding, sheltering, and returning 20,000 Grenadians to their homes. Over the next several months U.S. CA concentrated on post-hostility reconstruction. Active and reserve soldiers turned their attention to road constructions, finance, telephone repair, water plant operations, and education. A significant task for a nation run down by Marxist control. Civil Affairs once again answered the call during Operation *Just Cause*, establishing

and running large displaced civilian camps. *Desert Storm* and *Operation Urgent Fury* in Haiti serve as two recent examples where success in large measure hinged on the abilities of the Army's SOF skills. "In all its wars the U.S. has rediscovered the basic principle that civilian populations cannot be ignored. Military victory is not enough." (Sandler, 1991, p. 41)

Given its history and close ties to the Army Special Forces, it should come as no surprise that FA 39 should be linked closely to the SOF community, and eventually that is exactly what happened. The real leap forward for FA 39 occurred in 1986 with the Special Operations reform package sponsored by Senators Cohen, and Nunn. The act which created USSOCOM and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) was a significant step toward institutionalizing FA 39. The decision was made (after much debate) to include PSYOP and CA forces as part of the Special Operations community. The 1985 plan produced other significant initiatives. In 1990 the U.S. Army established the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), a subordinate command of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). This, in turn, facilitated the creation of a Military Occupational Skill, (MOS) 37F, and

38F, the Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Specialist. This has led to modernizing FA 39 unique equipment and capabilities and the establishment of the functional area 39 tract. Functional Area 39 was designed to train and provide the Army with quality trained PSYOP and CA officers.

Today, FA 39 soldiers are trained at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. USAJFKSWCS is a subordinate command of USASOC. It serves as the home for the training of both FA 39 officers and enlisted soldiers. The training is heavily influenced and monitored by the 4th Psychological Operations Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the Army's only active duty PSYOP and CA units. Although FA 39 has appeared to have found its niche, it still remains in a transitional period. The community must remain vigilant to ensure FA 39 is aloud to play its vital role in national security, and not slip into the comas of the past.

C. CONCLUSION

In light of the history and apparent growth, FA 39 has come to a critical junction in its growth. Our research will indicate and recent history will prove that the critical skills FA 39 soldiers bring to the fight are more

important than ever before. Unlike the past, we cannot afford to allow these skills to atrophy and still expect soldiers to answer the call on a sporadic basis as in years gone by. As already indicated, the creation of USSOCOM and the inclusion of PSYOP and CA was a major windfall for the discipline. The creation of USACAPOC in 1991 was further testament of the importance the Army places on these special skills and ensures their future. It is time, once again, to take a critical, objective look at the FA 39 organization and the direction it needs to head. At present, Functional Area 39 is a de facto branch without clout. It is time to consider the next rational step in the evolution of the FA 39 organization, that step is branch designation within the military organization. Like our Special Forces Brethren before us, FA 39 has all the necessary ingredients and infrastructure to become a branch. Our soldiers have an MOS and a career road map. It is time to consider this same road map for the Army and the FA 39 officer corps. This evolution is in the best interest of the Army, the officers and the soldiers they lead. An organization staffed by full time qualified personnel is in the best interest of everyone concerned. As it stands now, FA 39 is a branch de facto, however our revolving door policy concerning our officers hinders our long-term focus and development. The

designation of FA 39 as a branch would ensure the future of the discipline and staff it with officers with a vested long-term interest. This vested interest manifests itself in the form of well-trained soldiers, in sufficient quantity, to deploy and provide the maneuver commander with quality support.

FA 39 has come a long way, but it must continue to evolve. We are currently presented with excellent circumstances to consider the next logical step in the evolution of our organization. We must look to the future and prepare for it; all evidence suggests that it is time to take the next step.

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II. DEFINING THE MISSION NICHE

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will discuss two themes that are basic tenants throughout our work: The spectrum of conflict and the skill set that defines Functional Area (FA) 39. Utilizing these themes as basic points of departure, we will demonstrate the increased need for FA 39 skills, based on the threat environment and the changing requirements necessary to meet and keep pace within a dynamic and complex world that exists along the conflict spectrum. In addition, we shall define the skills unique to the FA 39 officer and evaluate them on the basis of quality, quantity and timeliness.

It is our purpose in the first part of this chapter to define the operational environment utilizing the spectrum of conflict framework. Utilizing this framework as a model, we shall diagram the operating environment and demonstrate the tendency toward low intensity conflict (LIC) over the past twenty years. We shall then look at the FA 39 requirements in relation to this LIC tendency and analyze how FA 39 has been applicable (past, present, and future) along the spectrum of conflict. It is our intention to demonstrate the importance of FA 39 in this complex, dynamic operational

environment, particularly with respect to missions that exists at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

Finally we shall discuss and define the skills (characteristics) that are defining of FA 39. In defining these skills we shall evaluate them as they relate to quality, quantity and timeliness, all elements required for successful operations. Lastly, we shall examine the importance of these skills in relation to the measures of perishability and responsiveness, and the impact they have in relation to quality, quantity and timeliness.

B. THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

To fully appreciate the skills that are provided by Functional Area 39, during peace, war or operations short of war, it is necessary to define the operational environment. The Spectrum of Conflict model provides an excellent framework and illustrates the range of conflict within the operational environment that FA 39 operates. This framework can be used as an analytical tool to help define the type of force package necessary to meet the challenge of a particular contingency. This has certainly been the case with FA 39. The framework can also be used as a tool to indicate the need for FA 39 to evolve and 'fit' in relation to the changing nature of the operational environment, as evidenced by the tendency to operate in the less

conventional environment. The downsizing of the Army relative to the end of the Cold War illustrates a similar application of this theory.

The Spectrum of Conflict model¹ (Figure 1) defines the




Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict

left and right limits of the operational environment and is used by military planners as a tool to define a possible range of missions and determine what forces to apply to the threat environment. Theorists of political and military science generally agree that there are three broad

¹ Spectrum of conflict model used is an adaptation from LTCDR Randall G. Bowdish's article "The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sixth Generation," Military Review, Nov-Dec 95, p.27

categories of warfare: low intensity conflict, limited war, and total war (Haynes, 1996). The Spectrum of Conflict illustrates these levels and further defines the operational environment of each.

The "short of war" side of the spectrum defines operations that are of low intensity and usually require less manpower and personnel with specialized skills. It may also reach the level of limited conflict within a set region, which theoretically would require a response based on a more quantitative show of force versus a specialized qualitative force to deter the threat. This is also the area (between the "short of war" and "conventional war") of the spectrum where the "gray area" exists. This operational environment goes from low intensity conflict to lesser regional contingencies and is defined as operations that require deterrence and support to diplomacy that stress political, economic and social conditions. These operations range from Host Nation Support and training to Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping to providing support to a lesser regional contingency. At the bottom end of the spectrum are the high intensity operations. This operational environment may range from responding to a major regional contingency to preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.

C. PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONAL TRENDS

In the introduction, a detailed history of Functional Area 39 was presented. As the empirical data indicated both PSYOP and CA have suffered the ebb and flow of conflict build-up and post combat draw down. A key to this "roller coaster" build up and draw down was the predictability of the operational environment. The bi-polar world following World War II enabled the military to focus on one major threat - the Soviet Union. Missions within the Spectrum of Conflict were countered with one mind-set, that conventional forces were the preferred solution and special operations forces had a "support when needed" role. As we will illustrate, the operational environment has shifted in the past twenty years, and with it the mind-set. Furthermore, we will show how FA 39 has played a major role during this shift by focusing on past, present and future applications of the functional area.

FA 39, as we currently know it, came into its own in the latter portion of the 1980s, thanks in large measure to the PSYOP master plan of 1985. Recognizing that we were losing the information cold war against the Soviets, President Reagan directed the US military PSYOP capability be revitalized. As we discussed in the historical introduction, this eventually led to the establishment of

USACAPOC and it has evolved to its current structure and organization. In years gone by, FA 39 was able to survive largely based on the threat environment and the assumption that there would be ample time to prepare and deploy to Europe. FA 39, like the rest of the Army, was governed by the Soviet threat. The very nature of the Cold War demanded a large standing conventional Army. While difficult in its own right, this straightforward, relatively predictable environment (from a conventional standpoint), lacks the complexity and dynamism found in the LIC environment.

The past has been dictated by a conventional approach to a major regional conflict. This mid to high intensity conflict dictated the way we prepared and thought about war, as evidenced by our Cold War doctrine. This conventional approach, while appropriate during the Cold War, given the threat, has proven cumbersome and difficult to implement during the shifting of the post Cold War threat environment. During the Cold War the FA 39 community suffered from the ebb and flow of the conventional emphasis. Korea and Vietnam provided us two excellent examples where FA 39 capabilities had to be revitalized in order to meet an unanticipated threat. While the Cold War provided us a relatively stable threat environment, the last twenty years have gradually changed our expectations of things to come.

By way of example, a quick analysis of Figure 2 will prove our tendency towards the lower end of the conflict spectrum. As the Cold War gave way to Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), we found ourselves in a totally new threat environment. Not only have we found that this environment is dynamic, but it is also complex in relation to our old conventional approach.

As we have moved toward the lower end of the spectrum of conflict we have learned that brute force alone does not solve or eradicate the problems encountered in anything short of war. Soldiers who are specially trained and prepared to deal with unconventional problems must deal with the human element, in the form of refugees and beleaguered civilians. The increased media coverage only serves to highlight the human dynamics in the LIC environment. The introduction of players, other than soldiers, in large part serves to increase the complexity of the environment. This is not to suggest that the conventional arena is not full of problems or that we shouldn't be capable of operating in that environment. This only suggests that the battle lines are much clearer and distinct in the high end of the spectrum, whereas lots of gray areas exist at the lower end of the spectrum. Unfortunately, this lack of clarity tends to introduce 'players' that make the task at hand much more

difficult and less doctrinally straight forward. As Figure 2 illustrates we have habitually found ourselves over the past twenty years operating in the low end of the spectrum.




FIGURE 2. Twenty-Year LIC Trend

As the Cold War came to an end in the late 80s and early 90s, the threat environment began to change. The administration began to recognize this phenomenon as evidenced by the reduction in force levels. As our attention has drifted away from the Soviets, we have found ourselves increasingly involved in the LIC environment. With the exception of the Persian Gulf War, we have operated exclusively in the lower end of the spectrum since Vietnam. While Grenada and Panama were more than Peace Operations,

one could certainly make the argument that these were Low Intensity Conflicts.

The present threat environment does not look too much different than that of seven years ago. We are currently operating in Bosnia and Kosovo with no relief in sight. While conventional forces are necessary for these types of operations, it is our "ambassadors in uniform" who do the lions share of the work. The tendency to operate in these environs has increased the need and the demand for FA 39 skills is high. The work is so plentiful that we dare say we cannot fully meet the demand, at best we can move from one operation to the next in a patchwork fashion, relying on the reserves to police the missions as we move from one hot spot to the next. As recent history will prove, the tendency in the FA 39 community is to respond to a crisis with the active duty and transition to the reserves after the situation has become stabilized. While this approach may appear to be successful on the surface, it comes at an enormous cost. There are an insufficient amount of active duty FA 39 officers to perform the contingencies and man other training requirements. The reliance on the reserves for relief is an unsatisfactory long-term solution, given the limitations and time constraints placed on their length of service.

This aspect of the organization bears further exploration and will be discussed in the next chapter, as these issues have a direct impact on the future of Functional Area 39. Given our recent history the future appears to hold an abundance of work.

The transition from a bi-polar to uni-polar world has created many opportunities for increased American involvement around the globe. The loss of the Soviet counter-balance has led to a greening or unleashing of insurgency and civil unrest. While a uni-polar world has its advantages, it increases our involvement in areas that were formerly uncharted. The very nature of the uni-polar environment virtually guarantees that our future involvements will remain along the lines of the LIC level. The inability of other actors to engage us at the mid to high intensity level suggests that the Unconventional Warfare approach is and will remain the choice of the future. We must be prepared for such outliers as Iraq but all evidence, and precedence (Figure 2) indicates that the Haitis and Kosovos will occur much more frequently than the Iraqs. As we continue to out distance our potential foes technologically, it becomes increasingly clear that potential threats will have to attack us in less conventional fashions. This inability to fight

conventionally will force our adversaries to pursue more unconventional solutions. Our continued participation in UN and coalition based peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance missions also suggest a less conventional approach to problem solving. What this implies is an increased need for special operations forces. Unconventional environments require unconventional solutions and the soldiers with special skills to operate in them. The future in retrospect appears to be a reflection of our recent past - an increase in LIC operations i.e. operations short of war. In order to meet the threat environment of the future we must adapt and evolve as an organization. All analysis suggests that the current trend will continue and perhaps increase in the future. By implication, the FA 39 organization must continue to evolve in order to keep pace with the changing threat environment. The current revolution in military affairs should serve as our "early warning" for an increased FA 39 capability.

D. FA 39 SKILLS: QUALITY, QUANTITY AND TIMELINESS

We have used the Spectrum of Conflict framework to illustrate the shift in the operational environment from the "High intensity conflict" to the "Low intensity conflict" side of the spectrum. Furthermore by showing that the FA 39 organization has a role throughout the spectrum, the next

logical step is to ask what key characteristics make the PSYOP and CA officer a vital role player in the operational environment. What skills does a FA 39 officer bring to the table that are multipliers in mission support and success? Can these skills (characteristics) be applied throughout or just at the lower end of the spectrum? Can the FA 39 officer operate in an environment that requires a joint, combined or interagency structure? Do these skills 'fit' into supporting missions that depend, independently or collectively, on qualitative skills and/or the quantity of people with these specialized skills? Is there a focus on the timeliness of getting these set skills in to provide immediate support?

Functional Area 39 is a SOF asset that can apply its focus throughout the spectrum based on the magnitude of the threat environment. As a SOF asset, FA 39 is currently trained and organized to execute two of the nine SOF principle missions (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs) and can directly or indirectly provide support to the remainder principle missions and collateral activities. (See Figure 3) FA 39 is also a versatile multiplier in that it is designed to support both conventional and SOF commanders.

SOF PRINCIPAL MISSION	SOF COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES
• Counterproliferation (CP)	• Coalition support
• Combating Terrorism (CBT)	• Combat search and rescue
• Foreign Internal Defense (FID)	• Counterdrug activities
• Special Reconnaissance (SR)	• Humanitarian demining activities
• Direct Action (DA)	• Humanitarian assistance
• Psychological Operations (PSYOP)	• Peace operations
• Civil Affairs (CA)	• Security assistance
• Unconventional Warfare (UW)	• Special activities
• Information Operations (IO)	

Figure 3. SOF Principal Missions and Collateral Activities

To continuously provide support to a changing operational environment, SOF forces apply six fundamental characteristics to a variation of principle missions and collateral activities. As defined by the 1998 SOF Posture statement these characteristics are

- Mature professionals with leadership abilities
- Specialized skills, equipment, and tactics
- Regional Focus
- Language skills
- Political and cultural sensitivity
- Small flexible, joint force structure

Although these characteristics are not solely unique to FA 39, they are the basis for the four skills set (language skills, regional focus, political and cultural sensitivity, and operational expertise) that are maintained, and solidify the training and mission validity of PSYOP and CA.

To demonstrate why we believe FA 39 must evolve to maintain its effectiveness, the FA 39 characteristics of language skills, regional focus, political and cultural sensitivity and operational expertise will be defined and explained in relation to how they apply to the measures of *quality, quantity, and timeliness*.

1. Language Skills

Each Functional Area 39 officer, PSYOP and CA, is required to attend a 6-12 month language school based on their assigned region of expertise. Upon completion of language school, each officer is required to maintain a listen, read, and speak proficiency level of 1+ or better (1 = proficient 3 = native speaker). Language is a vital qualitative skill that allows the officer to support a commander and his unit throughout the operational spectrum when a specific language is required. In contingencies requiring conventional forces, one or more FA 39 officers focused on that particular region can deploy and apply their language skills to coordinate with host nation federal,

local, and military authorities. In lesser contingencies, the FA 39 officer has the language skills to support SOF units or conventional support units (Engineers, Transportation, Military Police etc...) by coordinating and supporting training, information dissemination, and mission execution. On the active side, FA 39 officers can augment conventional or SOF units that are in a Ready Deployable Status (RDF). FA 39 is the only functional area that is available and deployable to support an operation with language as a core characteristic.

2. Regional Focus

Added to the language skill, each officer attends a four-month Regional Studies Course (RSC) in which the officer studies all five geographic regions of the world (Latin America, Asia/Pacific, Africa, Europe, or the Middle East), with a concentration in one. Particular attention is paid to the regional culture, customs, demographics and political - military factors of a given region. Regional focus, when added to language proficiency, becomes a vital characteristic that can be applied throughout the operational spectrum. Whether a FA 39 officer is supporting a Joint Task Force during Humanitarian or peacekeeping operations or coordinating with host nation authorities, knowledge of the region and its language makes that officer

a qualitative asset. Like all the FA 39 characteristics, regional expertise is a perishable skill that must be exercised and maintained or it will atrophy. Educating officers in regional expertise represents a sizeable investment in time and money. This is a reflection of the communities' commitment to quality, well-trained officers. Unfortunately we are not always able to produce them in sufficient numbers.

3. Political and Cultural Sensitivity

Each Functional Area 39 officer goes through intensive political and cultural sensitivity training. Apart from the regional studies course, each FA 39 officer attends the Psychological Operations Officer Course (POOC) and the Civil Affairs Officers Course (CAOC). During these courses cross-cultural communication skills and the POL/MIL factors are emphasized. This training arms the FA 39 officer with an appreciation for cultural and political awareness. The ability to apply political and cultural sensitivity provides enhancement to the language and regional focus skills of the Functional Area 39 officer.

4. Operational Expertise

Mature professionals with leadership abilities is a key SOF characteristic that is a prerequisite for all SOF personnel. In conjunction with the three previous

characteristics, maturity and leadership provide the basis for the final FA 39 skill to be discussed, operational expertise. Each FA 39 officer is selected from a pool of qualified Army officers who have commanded at platoon and company level and have served in a battalion or brigade staff. A majority of the officers have attended CAS3 and have a well-rounded understanding of conventional forces. It is this grounding in the conventional army that allows the FA 39 officer to make the transition into the SOF community. Add to that, the professional education obtained from attending the PSYOP and CA officer courses and you produce a functional area officer that has a wealth of potential. Operational expertise is then gained by combining these qualities with field experience. Operational expertise can only be learned through on the job training. This characteristic is a qualitative tangible multiplier to any operation that requires direct or indirect PSYOP or CA support that can only be learned through experience. When applied in a timely manner, FA 39 operational expertise can expand a commanders possibilities and mission versatility.

In discussing the four main characteristics of Functional Area 39 it becomes apparent that each officer trained in the functional area possesses a wealth of knowledge

and expertise. Furthermore, because of these characteristics, a FA 39 officer is capable of responding to operations within the left and right limits of the conflict spectrum. As in any SOF specialty, the maintenance of these skills and the ability to remain responsive in a variety of missions is always a challenge. It is an arduous task to maintain the proficiency and skill level required to operate as a qualified FA 39 officer; especially in the language and regional expertise skills. Perishability of skills due to deployments (out of one's region of expertise), loss of personnel, and expanding mission requirements are a reality to Functional Area 39. If not countered by a vigorous language, regional, political and cultural training program, the quality and timely responsiveness of PSYOP and CA becomes degraded.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter has defined the operational environment that Functional Area 39 operates in by using the spectrum of conflict (Figure 1) as a basis for analysis and to define the shift from the conventional to the LIC environment. To illustrate the importance of FA 39 in future conflicts we have relied heavily on previous trends (Figure 2). The uni-polar world virtually ensures our continued involvement in operations short of war. It is this expected increase in

operations that leads us to believe that there is an increased need for FA 39 skills. We have defined the skills (characteristics) in relation to this increased requirement.

The changing nature of the conflict environment, and the movement away from the Cold War mentality, has given way to a dynamic, complex environment that requires well-trained professionals whose skills are unique from the conventional army. These skills require responsiveness and are subject to atrophy if not maintained and regularly exercised.

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III. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ORGANIZE (OPTIONS)

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will discuss organization. We will define organization from the military perspective, and we will define the functional area organization. In this vein we shall define Functional Area 39 in organizational terms and explain its role in the Army's hierarchical structure (what a functional area is and the role it plays in the over all organization). Having defined a "functional area", we will then look at Functional Area 39 from a structural standpoint, outlining the accession, training, and utilization process. We shall also look at the structural differences between the Active and Reserve components. Lastly, we shall propose and briefly evaluate four alternative options for organization, they are:

- Remaining the way we are (Status Quo)
- Eliminate FA 39 (Have the functional area duties absorbed by the Special Forces Community)
- Expand the FA 39 to include the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) designation
- Evolve FA 39 to a branch organization

We will explore the merit of these options based on the strengths and weaknesses they offer the Army and Functional

Area 39. All the options will be evaluated on the basis of four criteria: quality, quantity, feasibility and rationality.

B. DEFINING "ORGANIZATION" AND "FUNCTIONAL AREA"

Field Manuel (FM) 101-5-1 defines an organization as "any military unit or larger command composed of two or more smaller units: In this meaning, an element of a command is an organization in relation to its components and a unit in relation to higher command." (p. 1-54) The Army is an organization with a defining structure of military elements prescribed by a table of organization and equipment (TOE) (p. 1-54). In the vocabulary of organizational theory, the Army is a "machine bureaucracy". It has standardized responsibilities, qualifications, communication channels, work rules, as well as a clearly defined hierarchy of authority. (Mintzberg, 1993)

The Army is a hierarchical organization that distributes authority to subordinate commands through a power down, information up system. Within this hierarchical structure, Army officers are slotted in positions that service to the needs of the organization. Officers fill either branch or functional area positions as warranted by the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).

With the exception of the Special Forces branch, which is a non-accession branch, all Army officers are initially accessed into one of 25 branches upon commissioning as a second lieutenant, and hold that branch designation throughout their careers. Department of Army Pamphlet 600-3 (*Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*) defines a branch as a "grouping of officers that comprises an arm of service of the Army in which, as a minimum, officers are commissioned, assigned, developed and promoted through their company grade years." (p. 8)

Officers are assessed into the Army as part of a cohort year group. The life cycle of a cohort year group can span 30 years of service, with automatic reductions in each cohort population at each promotion level.

In most cases officers serve their first eight to twelve years developing the leadership and tactical skills associated with their designated branch. In their sixth year of service, officers can augment this basic branch by selecting one of seventeen functional areas. Between an officer's eighth and twelfth year of service, and after an officer is basic branch qualified, three main avenues become available for continued career development. Branch and Functional Area career managers assess an officer's developmental objectives for post-branch qualification based

on the officers assignment patterns, performance, individual preference and Army requirements (DA PAM 600-3, 1998). At this point the officer will fall into one of three assignment and development patterns. These are (1) the continuation of basic branch assignments such as staff or faculty at service schools, (2) Branch/Functional area generalist such as ROTC or USMA faculty or staff, or (3) functional area development such as Functional Area 39.

As defined by DA PAM 600-3, a functional area is "a grouping of officers by technical specialty or skill, which usually requires significant education, training and experience." (p. 8) An officer is assigned his or her functional area between the fifth and sixth year of service. Individual preference, academic background, manner of performance, training and experience and needs of the Army are all taken into consideration when assigning a functional area to an officer. The 17 functional areas, like the basic branches, are aligned under one of four Career Field Designations (CFD). These CFDs are Operations, Information Operations, Institutional Support and Operational Support. The majority of functional area billets in the Army TOE require field grade officers. As mentioned above, officers are designated into a functional area in or about their sixth year of service; however, the officer may never serve

in his FA or may not be assigned to a FA tour until he is promoted to major. One exception is Functional Area 39, which requires senior captains to fill tactical positions within the 4th Psychological Operations Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

Functional Area 39 is unique in two important respects. First, it is the only functional area that falls within the Operations Career Field. This career field maintains all basic branches that are considered "war fighters", experts in the full spectrum of operations, including deployment, employment, and sustainment of ground forces engaged in armed combat with an enemy force (DA PAM 600-3, p.7). Second, FA 39 is the only functional area that affords command opportunities throughout the FA life cycle and is the only functional area that is a SOF asset with distinctive SOF principle missions and collateral activities.

The majority of the officers selected for Functional Area 39 will serve a three to four year utilization tour upon accession into the FA. Upon completion of their basic branch company grade qualification, the FA 39 officer makes a PCS move to Fort Bragg, NC to begin training for FA 39 duties. Training can last from one to three years.

Functional Area 39 officers must attend the Psychological Operations Officer Course (POOC), the Civil Affairs Officers Course (CAOC), and a Regional Studies course (RSC). Upon completion, the majority of officers will attend language school or, if selected, attend a graduate program to obtain a masters degree. Language training is a prerequisite before assignment into a FA 39 coded position, while the graduate degree is not.

Up to this point we have focused on the active component of Functional Area 39. Although FA 39 is an active duty proponent, it maintains close liaison with the reserve PSYOP and CA communities in training, doctrine and resources. In the reserve component, Civil Affairs is a non-accession branch (code 38) that gains its manpower from basic branch officers in the reserve forces. Reserve PSYOP officers are basic branch officers with the Functional Area 39 specialty. The proponent for Functional Area 39 (active and reserve) and the Reserve CA branch fall under the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) located at Fort Bragg, NC. Both active and reserve PSYOP and CA units fall under the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) for command and control. USACAPOC falls under the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC),

which falls under the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

In accordance with DA PAM 600-3, Reserve Civil Affairs officers are required to be basic branch qualified and attend the two week Reserve Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course (RCAOAC) before they are accessed into the branch (DA PAM 600-3, 1998). It is recommended that the officer attend the Regional Studies Course and Language School when time permits from their civilian profession. While active CA officers are considered generalist, the reserve component officer can use their civilian occupational skills, which can be adapted to one of the four support to civil administration categories (government, economic, public facilities, and special functions). Reserve PSYOP officers are also required to be basic branch qualified and attend the Psychological Operations Officers Course (POOC). Like the Reserve CA officer, the Regional Studies Course and language training are highly recommended when time permits. The Reserve PSYOP units are structured in the same manner as the active tactical battalion. All reserve PSYOP units are tactical.

While the total Army concept fosters a congenial working relationship between active and reserve forces, no other organization (to include branch or functional area) in

the Army relies so heavily upon the reserves. In an organization approximately 9,000 strong, roughly 75% is made up of reservists. While other branches may have a majority of their wartime assets in the reserves, FA 39 is the only organization that employs its reserve forces on a continual basis, outside of wartime declarations. It is this reliance along with the threat environment, and our perceived opinion, that we are not adequately able to meet the demands of the future that lead to us explore alternative forms of organization.

C. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

1. Remaining the way we are (Status Quo)

In option number one we shall examine the *Pros* and *Cons* of retaining the current Functional Area 39 organization. We shall refer to this option as maintaining the status quo.

a) *Pro's*

Perhaps the most logical reason to 'maintain the status quo' is because we have a working system in place. The system "isn't broken per se"; therefore, "it doesn't need to be fixed." While the Functional Area 39 organization is not without problems, it has established itself as a viable element throughout the Army. The notion of doing more with less is a reality in a downsizing army

and a function of doing business that must be accepted. Rather than make changes to the organization, innovative ways should be found to work with-in the given constraints. A drastic change may be inappropriate at this time.

The second reason to maintain the status quo is the proven success of FA 39. Functional Area 39 has been successful in two significant ways. First, FA 39 officers have developed a reputation as quality, well-trained, hard working officers who get the mission accomplished. FA 39 officers have served with distinction in operations all along the spectrum of conflict (Figure 2). They also have and are engaged in many unpublicized operations. FA 39 officers have greatly enhanced the maneuver commanders' options and are credited with many successes on the battlefield. Second, FA 39 officers have the ability to export SOF skills into the conventional Army. Functional Area 39 has made significant advances in educating conventional commanders on the merits of FA 39 integration. Although not there yet, commanders are beginning to integrate the FA 39 Battlefield Operating System (BOS) on a regular basis and are utilizing FA 39 at unprecedented levels. At a time that FA 39 is really coming into its own, perhaps it is not a good idea to rock the boat.

Finally, OPMS XXI stands to eliminate many of the

current concerns over the stability of functional areas'. According to the new plan, officers assessed into the operations field would remain in a given career field after the ten-year mark. This could conceivably eliminate the dual-tracking problem, at least for a portion of the assessed force.

b) Con's

Although there are many reasons to remain the way we are, perhaps the most compelling reason to change is FA 39's inability to adequately meet the changing threat environment. As noted earlier in this thesis, the evolving threat environment requires and will, arguably, increasingly require a heavy reliance on SOF forces with specialized SOF skills. As noted in figure 2, this precedence has been set for decades with no apparent relief in sight. We do not have the active force structure in place to adequately meet the demands that the operational environment is placing on us. The lack of sufficient personnel to conduct the plethora of missions, places a further demand on an already over tasked force. The price is devastating. It manifests itself in poor morale and lower retention rates, but most importantly it degrades FA 39's ability to support the maneuver commander. While this fast paced OPTEMPO may appear to offer the opportunity to further refine critical

skills, it has often had the opposite effect, requiring regionally oriented soldiers to work out of sector, thus atrophying their language and regional expertise.

Perhaps the second greatest reason to forgo the status quo is the 'revolving door' that is created by Functional Area 39. The single greatest problem that is created by the dual tracking system is the lack of stability within the functional area. In most cases, neither the Army nor the functional area are getting the optimal return on their training and educational investment. Countless highly trained and skilled FA 39 officers are allowed to leave the functional area after a three or four year utilization tour. The real irony in this system is that this is just about the time when the officer is becoming truly proficient in his mastery of the 39 skills. Although a dual tracked officer may return to the functional area years after his initial FA tour, his SOF skills have atrophied, he must relearn his language and he must regain his lost FA proficiency. While this is more cost effective than training a new officer from scratch, it is reality that many dual tracked officers do not return.

While some officers find themselves in a position to dual track, others are not so fortunate. Time constraints and limited job opportunities often force

quality officers back to their basic branch. The lack of functional area qualifying job opportunities is limited in FA 39. If an officer fails to meet the requirements and qualifications as set forth by DA PAM 600-3, his potential growth within the functional area is stunted. This inability to meet the requirements is often no fault of the officer or a reflection of poor performance. It often stems from a limited availability of jobs and insufficient time to obtain the proper one.

This concept works in reverse as well. Officers who have no future in their basic branch, or who have stayed too long in the functional area, are often forced by circumstance to apply for single-track status or return to their basic branch with no hope of obtaining a branch-qualifying job. While Functional Area 39 has made significant strides in overcoming an earlier "quality stigma", the goal of the functional area should be officers who have a long-term vested interest in the organization by choice, rather than by circumstance (or the best deal going).

2. Eliminating FA 39 (The SF Option)

In option number two we explore the pro's and con's of eliminating Functional Area 39 and having the Special Forces branch assume the duties and responsibilities of PSYOP and

Civil Affairs. The rationale for this option is the similar set of core skills (language, cultural sensitivity, regional orientation, and operational expertise). PSYOP and CA are SOF principle missions, and one could argue that the very nature of SF and its principle mission of training indigenous peoples is nothing more than a natural extension of the FA 39 mission of "winning the hearts and minds". However, for every compelling reason to consider this option, there is an equally compelling reason to discount it. Let us explore these reasons.

a) Pro's

Perhaps the most compelling and logical reason for eliminating FA 39 is the duplicity of skills shared by both the SF and Functional Area 39 officer. The skill set that makes FA 39 officers such a valuable asset can be found in the well-trained and motivated SF officer as well. As a matter of fact, both groups share the same set of SOF characteristics. This skill set, while difficult to grow and maintain, is easily transferable within the SOF community. Once an SF officer has mastered the fundamentals of his trade, he could easily move within the SF community and acquire additional expertise in other SOF missions and collateral activities, outside the scope of Unconventional Warfare (UW). This transferability/sharing of skills is

evident today given the fact that a general purpose CA team mirrors that of a Special Forces A team and is primarily made up of noncommissioned officers from the 18 series MOS. Merging FA 39 and SF would facilitate the retainment of SF officers and NCOs under the Special Forces umbrella, thus reducing the amount of time they would spend outside the community and have the added benefit of less skill atrophy.

The next logical argument for this option is the nature of the SOF umbrella. The education of Army SOF soldiers falls under the rubric of USASOC. Because the schoolhouse trains both FA 39 and SF officers, it could be more economical to expand the scope and length of SF training to include the critical FA 39 skills and eliminate the FA 39 curriculum. The USAJFKSWCS could surely restructure the scope of SF qualification to include FA 39 duties. The somewhat apparent duplicity of training and command structure appears to make this sensible, if not a feasible option.

The third reason to explore this option is the exportation of unconventional soldiers to the conventional army. As discussed earlier, the FA 39 officer spends a large majority of time supporting the conventional commander. This cross-fertilization of UW officers is beneficial for several reasons. First, it gives the

conventional army exposure to the roles and professionalism of the SOF community, and it exposes the SF officer to the tactics and 'Modis Operandi' of the Regular Army. This ability to revisit would allow the SOF officer to remain in touch with the conventional (big picture) army and ensure the conventional army exposure to its SOF forces. It could focus as a reminder that it is one army and the conventional and non-conventional soldier are not mutually exclusive to mission accomplishment.

Finally, the expansion of SF would force the organization to grow, decreasing the SOF community's reliance on the reserves. As was mentioned earlier, the reliance on the reserves cannot continue at its present rate, nor is it a viable long-term solution. The natural bi-product of increasing the SF workload should be an increase in force structure. While this option intentionally avoids discussing the question, "Do we want a larger SF force structure and is bigger better?" This assumes that in order to take on additional responsibilities, the size of the SF organization must increase versus elimination of other SOF principle missions and collateral activities.

b) Con's

When viewed in this light, the logic for the

option can appear to be quite persuasive. However, as we shall see, the counter-argument is quite compelling in its own right and may very well negate the apparent attractiveness of this option.

Although, at first glance, there may appear to be duplication of effort between SF and Functional Area 39, once out of the schoolhouse, the disciplines are quite different. It is a fact that SF and FA 39 share many of the same skills (language, cultural sensitivity, etc...). As members of the SOF community, all soldiers share the SOF characteristics. The very nature of having to deal with the "human element", forces SF and FA 39 to share many of the same core attributes, but not everyone can be or wants to be Special Forces. If SF were to assume the duties of FA 39, the Army would lose a large potential recruiting demographic. The fact is, not everyone wants or is capable of passing SF qualifications. The SF selection and qualification process does not guarantee a quality FA 39 officer either. The bottom line, however, is that many officers drawn to FA 39 duties may be deterred from doing so, if the road passes through SF branch.

FA 39 is successful, in large measures, due to the diversity and experience the wide range of officers bring with them to the functional area. It is this blending of

diversified talent and experience that make FA 39 a viable force multiplier. The elimination of a large sector of the recruitable officer population (by SF qualification prerequisites) would have a negative impact on the discipline, regardless of whether SF was in charge of PSYOP and CA or not.

Although it may sound good and make perfect sense, exporting SF officers to the conventional army could be more detrimental than beneficial. Assuming that SF branch took over the duties of FA 39, they would have to participate in conventional exercises and deployments on a more frequent basis. The FA 39 BOS is a conventional commanders responsibility. This perceived special operations mission might give the conventional commander the excuse (or rationale) to totally disregard the 39 Battlefield Operating System and wash his hands of the responsibility. The perception that it is a SOF concern could easily be lost amongst the other (conventional) combat multipliers, thus giving conventional commanders an excuse to discount it as strictly a SOF responsibility.

As it stands now, FA 39 is engaged in a constant fight to educate the conventional army on the importance and integration of the FA 39 BOS into conventional planning. FA 39 and the Army have come a long way in realizing the

utility and importance of FA 39. A revisit to Figure 2 can help clarify its utility. The nature of our involvement over the last 20 years (and including Vietnam) reinforces time and again the criticality of the FA 39 skills. The battle for integration remains, however, the functional area is making good progress. Giving their responsibilities to the SF branch only invites and provides the conventional commander with the excuse he needs to wash his hands of the FA 39 responsibilities. The reality of the situation remains: the 39 Battlefield Operating System is the conventional commander's responsibility, regardless of this operating system's custodian.

Perhaps the most compelling reason not to have SF branch assume the duties of FA 39 is that the personnel system is not capable of supporting it. Under our current system, all 39 coded positions would have to be filled by SF qualified officers. Assuming the positions were changed to 18 series positions, this would still not eliminate several major problems. First, the nature of 39 positions is rank heavy at the field grade level. Filling the necessary FA 39 positions with SF officers would inhibit their ability to become branch qualified in 18 series jobs, IAW DA Pam 600-3 criteria. Thus, many officers would find it difficult to become branch qualified in the presently allocated time

frame. Assuming the positions were changed to reflect code 18, the basic branch qualifying jobs still remain. Conceivably, the branch could and would establish a dual tracking system within the branch, but again, this would not satisfy basic 18 series branch requirements. In effect, five years as a major would not be enough time to complete branch qualification at that rank. If an officer were unfortunate enough to find himself in a collateral position (FA 39 job) he would fall behind his contemporaries (peers) and become less competitive for branch jobs. A natural bi-product may be that he finds himself working in the collateral duties as a result, and a dual track is created within the branch. This situation is not unlike many throughout the current 39 organization today. Spending too much time in the functional area virtually eliminates one's opportunity to remain competitive in his basic branch. Regardless of the circumstances, SF branch would not be capable of assuming the jobs and duties of FA 39 without a major restructuring of the personnel system.

3. Expand the FA to include the FAO designation

One of the most attractive options is the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) option. Under option three, Functional Area 39 (PSYOP and CA) and 48 (FAO) would be combined. Like the SF option, we see many of the same benefits, with apparently

fewer drawbacks. There are many reasons one could argue for (but also against) this option. Let us explore these reasons.

a) Pro's

Perhaps the most significant reason to consider combining the 39 and 48 functional areas is the transferability of qualitative skills. Like PSYOP and CA, the FAO shares the same skill set that made the FA 39 soldier unique (language, cultural sensitivity, regional orientation, and operational expertise). As a matter of fact, the FA 39 program was modeled after the FA 48 program, with a few exceptions. When an officer graduates from the FA 48 program he is ready to be an assistant attaché. Training a qualified FA 48 officer is no small task and no small commitment of Army time and money. It is a serious undertaking. The training program can last anywhere from three to five years, depending on language difficulty and advanced degree completion requirements. The problem once again, is how to avoid skill atrophy, while remaining competitive in one's basic branch. Like PSYOP and CA, the FAO must revisit his basic branch to obtain troop time and complete branch qualifying jobs. This two to three year break in functional area time virtually guarantees that the officer's skills will atrophy. It is unrealistic to expect

that the officer will maintain his or her language and cultural skills while working ten to fourteen hours a day in a branch qualifying position.

The beauty of this option is that it eliminates the branch-qualifying dilemma and it allows both FA 39 and 48 officers to remain green in an environment that encourages and is designed to prevent the atrophy of functional skills. By managing the discipline and the placement of officers, it appears, the Army could have the best of both worlds. Because FA 39 is regionally focused and structured to support both SOF and conventional forces, officers could be regionally focused while obtaining branch-qualifying jobs under the current organizational structure. While not an easy task to manage, this combining and cross training of disciplines reaps several immediate rewards. It allows the officer to maintain critical perishable skills while gaining valuable troop qualifying jobs to keep him green. This, in turn, would decrease the need for refresher courses and allow the officer to build credibility in preparation for future assistant and attaché assignments. An added benefit would be the unique skills that a fully trained PSYOP and CA officer would bring to the attaché positions. The result is an "in touch" attaché who is fully capable of advancing the mission of the United States - a

true ambassador in uniform. The officer would know both the country team and the CINC, and be trusted by both.

Another possible benefit of combining FA 39 and 48 would be the increase in job opportunities for the collective group. While plenty of opportunities exist at the lower field grade levels, fewer opportunities exist at the 05 and 06 level. Scores of jobs currently coded for 48's at the senior level go unfilled due to lack of sufficient personnel to fill them. A marriage of these disciplines would provide greater opportunity to a significantly wider range of officers by both providing the junior FA 48s a place to become qualified while remaining green, while increasing the potential career longevity of FA 39s by opening opportunities that had previously not existed.

The final benefit from option three is an increase in force structure. While this may appear initially to be a benefit based on where you sit, it makes sense when you weigh the objective benefits versus the cost. A modest increase in force size to increase job opportunity relieves the combat arms branches of the responsibility to branch qualify FA 48s. While this is merely a reshuffling of the cards to a large extent, it creates increased opportunities in the combat arms branches as well. By eliminating the

responsibilities to branch qualify dual tracked FA 48 officers, more branch qualifying jobs are created for that particular branch. While nominative assignments would still have to be filled by the branches, the new 39/48 organization could also be eligible. While this option requires a potentially modest increase in force structure, it can be done within the current organizational design.

b) Con's

As logical and sensible as it may appear to combine the Functional Area 39 and 48 disciplines, one can make a strong argument against it. For every strength there is a weakness that is not easily overcome.

While FA 39 and 48 share a similar skill set and the 39 program was modeled after the 48 program, there is still a large disparity in the quantity and time necessary to train the given disciplines. While both disciplines receive quality training, the FA 39 program would have to greatly increase its training base to meet the minimum standards required to be a trained and qualified FAO.

The Functional Area 48 program begins with a fully funded advanced degree completion program. A graduate degree takes an average of one and a half years to complete. A masters degree program is offered to FA 39 officers and while encouraged, is not guaranteed or a prerequisite.

Combining the two disciplines would make it so. Language training for a FA 48 officer takes from 6 months to two years, depending on the language. The FA 39 officer is language trained as well. The FA 48 officer receives a three-month regional orientation attaché brief up. The FA 39 officer attends a four-month regional studies course. Prior to assuming a position of assistant attaché, the FA 48 officer will participate in In Country Training (ICT), which lasts from one to one and a half years. The FA 39 officer will not. A quick analysis of the data shows that it takes anywhere from three to five years to train a FAO, while it takes two to three years to train a FA 39 officer (assuming he went to graduate school and studied a language for one year). While both disciplines produce well educated and highly trained officers, the FA 39 officer would have to be trained to the FA 48 standard to ensure that there was no training disparity amongst the initial level entry officers. While disparity can be overcome, it would only be at great cost in time and resources. In order to implement such a program, the gap between the two functional areas would have to be bridged. Perhaps a grandfather clause could be implemented to allow marginally qualified officers to assume many vacant positions; however, this option may compromise the integrity of the functional areas. Credibility issues

in the FA 39 and 48 arena can take years to overcome, and now when FA 39 has begun to come into its own, why jeopardize what has been gained.

While serving time within a tactical PSYOP Bn or the 96th CA Bn could certainly qualify as keeping an officer green, one could argue that branch qualifying jobs in the regional battalions are questionable. The nature of the regional battalion is strategic and affords little opportunity to refine conventional army tactics. While such a job may keep an officer proficient in language and regional awareness, he is basically secluded from the rest of the Army. If the intent of branch qualifying jobs for FAOs is to maintain currency with Army doctrine, tactics and procedures, a strategic PSYOP job is sub optimal. While it is questionable how much technical expertise a FAO must have (i.e. jack of all trades in relation to the Army), we feel it is safe to say we want ambassadors in uniform, not politicians with army training.

While inertia and parochialism tend to be poor arguments against change, perhaps in this instance it is justified. The nature of the FAOs job requires a certain shroud of mystery; perhaps the standards need to remain high, segregated, and extremely selective. While combining the two functional areas has many undeniable attractions, a

larger organization could well suggest a lack of, or lessening of, quality. In order to overcome this apparent disparity in quality, a division could conceivably be made for the cream of the crop. Select officers could be earmarked for attaché positions based on superior performance while the ones not selected would fill team and staff positions. This, in effect, would create a dual track within the branch, a system not unlike the ones already in place.

4. Evolve FA 39 to Branch Designation

The final option involves Functional Area 39 evolving to branch designation. Perhaps the most logical and rational option, it too comes with a cost. The cost, however, appears to be far less than the price, if FA 39 fails to meet the changing threat environment. Like SF, prior to branch designation, FA 39 is structured like a branch, and it is time to evolve to meet future requirements. The basic premise for FA 39 evolution (which we will discuss in detail in Chapter 4) looks very similar to the path taken by the SF branch some twelve years ago.

Like SF, FA 39 would be a non-accession branch. Once the officer is basic branch qualified; the opportunity to be accessed into a FA 39 branch would become an option. This option would allow officers in their six to eight year mark

to have not only one but two non-accession branches to choose from in the special operations arena. In view of the other specified alternatives, making FA 39 a branch satisfies a majority of the benefits addressed previously. Like the previous three options, however, making FA 39 a branch also has its faults. This section will examine both arguments.

a) Pro's

The primary reasons to evolve FA 39 to branch designation is the need to adapt to the changing threat. As we discussed in the last chapter, the operational environment has shifted in the past twenty years and the need for FA 39 SOF characteristics has increased. There is no argument that both PSYOP and CA have made significant strides in their ability to provide support to the maneuver commander, but the current functional area structure can not maintain pace and provide the optimum support demanded by the operational environment. The 'revolving door' syndrome continuously hampers the FA 39 community's ability to fill critical positions with fully qualified and trained FA 39 officers. While the current structure is focused on filling the slots of the 4th POG and 96th CA BN, many critical jobs remain unfilled (or filled by marginally qualified officers) at the expense of the Army. While these organizations are

the only active PSYOP and CA units, there are many questions that arise in regards to structure and organization under the current system. How does FA 39 fill the coded slots that are meant to support and educate the conventional Army on PSYOP and CA? If PSYOP and CA are two primary SOF missions, and the current trend on the spectrum points towards operations that are heavy in humanitarian and information support, why are we not doing everything in our power to ensure the future of the organization? These are just few of the many questions that this option could eliminate.

A solution that is always offered in overcoming the operational shortage in the active component is the use of reserve forces. Because the majority of PSYOP and CA assets are in the reserves (above 75%), the temptation (and often the requirement) to continuously call-up a reserve unit to support real world contingencies always exists. One advantage of making FA 39 a branch would be a reduced reliance on reserve forces during contingencies. The argument here is having an active structure that is available to support the here and now, not towards the reliance on the capability and competence of our reserve component.

Making Functional Area 39 a branch would also eliminate many quality of life issues continuously faced by both officers and enlisted in the PSYOP and CA field. By accessing an officer into a branch rather than a functional area, the individual's investment becomes long-term. The individual commits to a branch and wears its insignia, while in a functional area there is no insignia, no feeling of ownership, and the commitment is focused on the three to four year tour, with the basic branch still holding the individual's future in its hands. A branch also has advantages over a functional area in terms of the community's ability to control personnel, resources, and shape the future of the organization. The option to evolve FA 39 to branch designation, in short, would combine many of the pro's addressed in the previous options (eliminate skill atrophy, solve the revolving door problem, etc...) and eliminate many of the con's.

b) Con's

As with any organizational change, the process of transition itself is painful. Making FA 39 a branch would be no exception. The task of expanding the current FA 39 proponent office into a branch headquarters, the coding and filling of personnel slots, the restructuring or expansion of units, and the possibility of changing doctrine and

training are only a few considerations. A major consideration would come in losing gained credibility while the changes occurred. As mentioned before, FA 39 operators have slowly but surely gained respect for the skills and capabilities they bring to the maneuver commander. The old adage of "if ain't broke, don't fix it" would be a constant reminder to all affected.

As in the previous options, the OPMS XXI initiative, as currently defined, is a major obstacle to making FA 39 a branch. It could be argued that OPMS XXI has already made FA 39 a quasi-branch. As previously discussed, officers are accessed in to FA 39 between their sixth and eight year and after a one to three year training period serve in a PSYOP or CA position. Once an officer has fulfilled his initial commitment to FA 39, they have the option to return to their basic branch or put in for career field designation as a single tracked FA 39 officer. Either way the officer will remain in the Operations field, either in their basic branch or FA 39. Unfortunately, this does not resolve the 'revolving door' issue. What happens to those officers who have committed themselves to FA 39 for approximately five years and are not given one of twenty-five slots allocated to FA 39 CFD? Are they still competitive for qualifying jobs in their basic branch? not

likely. The competition will be for jobs that are also sought by basic branch officers who did not choose or were not accessed into Functional Area 39, but stayed and filled basic branch related jobs. As discussed in previous options, officers take a risk in remaining competitive if the functional area commitment becomes too long.

Finally, the strongest argument against making FA 39 a branch is the reserve component issue. Reserve Civil Affairs officers already have a branch, while reserve PSYOP officers fall under the FA 39 proponent. By making FA 39 a branch, would the reserve component fall under the new branch like reserve infantry, armor and artillery officers? What would happen to the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC)? Would it evolve into the proponent headquarters like SF command has evolved? While the reserve component maintains specialty skills and the active component maintains the majority of generalist, how would the new branch structure effect roles and missions? These are realistic questions that could bring unpopular answers, but questions that have been presented to other branches and successfully solved.

The option to evolve FA 39 into a branch makes common sense from three main points. First, branch designation would stabilize an organization whose skills are

continuously warranted in a dynamic operational environment. Second, branch designation would eliminate the 'revolving door' effect, thus strengthening individual commitment and focus, while streamlining organizational turbulence. Third, branch designation would align active and reserve PSYOP and CA components under one component. This would stimulate the total army concept and mirror other active/reserve relationships within the U.S. Army.

As in all major organizational changes, the initial disadvantages of branch designation may appear insurmountable and influence a "too hard to do" mindset. Too much is at stake, however, to take this issue this lightly. If the situation is approached from the perspective that organizations must continuously adapt to maintain an edge in an ever-changing operational environment, then making FA 39 a branch should be the next logical step for PSYOP and CA.

D. CONCLUSION

The intent of this chapter was to explain and define the FA 39 organization. By providing alternative options for growth and elaborating on the perils of remaining the way we are, our intent was to stimulate discussion and present 'reasonable' options for the growth and future of FA 39. Having analyzed the options on the basis of feasibility and rationality, all may be regarded as within reach. Our

conclusion, however, is that evolving FA 39 into a free standing branch is the most optimal available solution. Branch designation is in the best interest of the officer, the functional area, and the Army.

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IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR BRANCH DESIGNATION

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will argue the rationale and merit of option four (branch designation). While we recognize there are many critical issues outside the scope of our research (that bear further exploration) our analysis indicates that option four is the best solution and the most logical step in the evolution of FA 39. This argument is made on the assumption that the options in Chapter III were feasible, logical and quite possible if the Army was so inclined to choose one. However, we recognize that all options come with a cost and a certain pain threshold. We argue on behalf of option Four based on 3 primary considerations:

- The revolving door issue
- The fallacy of OPMS XXI in relation to FA 39
- Meeting the threat and personnel numbers

We will also use the Special Forces Branch as a blueprint to argue the similar circumstances between the two disciplines and pose the question, why not Functional Area 39? In paralleling the two arguments it is our intent to demonstrate the similar circumstances and use the SF branch

as support in our argument. Finally, we will look further at the potential barriers to FA 39 branch designation. We will address the issue of the Reserve component, funding and other parochial arguments. It is our intent to provide a convincing rationale to discount these arguments for the greater good of the Army, and the officers and soldiers who constitute the functional area.

B. THE REVOLVING DOOR ISSUE

One of the major points we have argued throughout this thesis is the impact the dual tracking system (revolving door) has on Functional Area 39. This system clearly presents quality, quantity, training and financial issues, which place unnecessary strain on the organization. There should be no doubt that the FA produces a quality trained officer; the training is first rate, expensive but well worth it. This issue then becomes not so much a question of quality but rather one of quantity. Can we produce the required number of officers with the required skills to meet the needs of the Army? A look at Figure 4 would suggest we could. Although we assess between 130-160 officers into the functional area per year, only about 100 (65%) actually report, and of those 35% do one tour and never return. While the revolving door offers potential career




Figure 4. Active FA 39 Officers

opportunities in either one's branch or functional area, the revolving door carries a host of perceptual issues that have a negative connotation all their own. Of the dual track officers, approximately 35% never return for a tour later in their career. While no one would argue the potential career merits of such a system, the perception is often one of an officer's self-serving interests. While this may or may not be the case, it is clearly the message we send to our subordinates.

Along with the quality/quantity issue, the revolving door presents a significant training issue. Officers who have left the functional area require refresher training

when they return. While this refresher can take many informal (as well as formal) paths, it is always a drain on the organization that can be largely eliminated by branch designation. Functional Area skill levels, which were only purchased in the first place with a significant investment in Army time and money, should not be allowed to deteriorate so simply. It is not reasonable to expect a dual tracked officer to maintain his skills when he returns to his basic branch. Or perhaps more aptly put, though reasonable, it cannot be expected.

The whole revolving door issue comes with a price. While the actual financial cost of initial training and refresher training were outside the scope of our research, it should still be fairly clear that the training of a 39 officer comes at significant financial cost. Every time we allow a 39 to walk out the door, it costs the Army more money. We must train someone to replace him or eventually refresh his training if he chooses to return. In most cases the officer that leaves the functional area is leaving when he is most valuable - at the point where he is becoming proficient in his job. In either case, the Army is not getting the optimal return on its investment. Making FA 39 a branch would eliminate the revolving door and greatly decrease the occurrences of skill atrophy.

C. THE OPMS XXI FALLACY

While the uninformed may argue that the creation of OPMS XXI eliminates or negates the FA 39 branch designation argument, the fact is that it changes very little, if anything, for FA 39 officers. The intent of OPMS XXI is to ensure that "officers are designated into a single career field after selection for Major and serve and compete for promotion in their designated career field from that point on." (DA PAM 600-3, p. 18) This is not truly the case. While FA 39 falls under the operations CFD, only twenty-five *single-tracked* officers are assessed into the functional area per year. In reality this means that those that are not selected are still effectively dual tracked, or at the very least, not competitive in their basic branch and not wanted by the functional area. The functional area is returning approximately 75 trained officers to their basic branch. While this dilemma may appear to be the non-selected officers problem, the perception of a one in four chance may deter perspective candidates from investing four years in a possible career detrimental job. While OPMS XXI claims to be an evolutionary system that is highly flexible (i.e. able to adapt to changing environmental circumstances) the claim remains unproven. (DA PAM 600-3)

Clearly, according to our evidence (see Figure 4) it would appear we have enough officers to fill the needed positions, however will twenty-five per year be enough? Perhaps the annual review will reflect the systems new capability and increase the required numbers accordingly. Flexibility notwithstanding, Functional Area 39 requires a tremendous amount of Captains to man the various detachment and team positions. These officers will still require the requisite training to perform their jobs. These jobs are filled by officers who, more often than not, have not yet been boarded for Major. In essence, what we have is the investment of time and money in 100 officers, of whom twenty-five will be officially designated into the FA 39 CFD. We still have failed to eliminate a huge waste of time and money. The bottom line is that while OPMS XXI may be the right thing for the majority of the Army; it does little for Functional Area 39 as it is presently structured.

D. MEETING THE THREAT/ PERSONNEL NUMBERS

While we had anticipated that we would prove our theory that the Army was short of FA 39 officers, from a purely numbers perspective this does not appear to be the case. There are 337 authorized FA 39 positions (see Figure 4) in the Army. There are 1,153 FA 39s in the Army. This number, however, accounts for all FA 39's and is quite deceptive

taken by itself. This number includes anyone who is a FA 39 officer. It does not necessarily reflect the number of FA 39's who are presently working in the functional area. While it appears that we are at an over-strength, personal experience makes us question the distribution of those 1,153 personnel. Perhaps the numbers do not tell the whole story and we must analyze the problem from another angle. While it appears that we have sufficient manpower, this is not necessarily the case. The average number of days a FA 39 soldier deploys a year is approximately 220. At any given time the functional area has approximately 300 to 700 soldiers deployed per week. While this number varies based on the number of commitments, 500 is a pretty good snapshot. Of this, approximately 60% are reservist. While this percentage may vary, it habitually remains reserve component heavy. No other component in the Army relies so heavily on the reserve component. While this integration may appear in keeping with the total Army concept, we cannot help but pose the question: How long can we continue to rely on the reserves to shoulder this percentage of the burden? FA 39 has a 179-day cap on deployment days for any given soldier in the functional area. This 179-day cap was instituted because of the large number of days a FA 39 soldier spends deployed. Active duty commanders find it nearly impossible

to operate within this 179-day window. This is evident by the fact that each soldier averages approximately 220 deployed days per year. This suggests that we cannot meet the requirements placed upon the active functional area component, thus forcing a heavy reliance on the reserve component. (see Figure 5, "Total Force Structure Strength") While it may appear we have plenty of FA 39s in the Army this is not effectively the case. When approached in this light, we are not meeting the demands placed upon us. With every, Bosnia, Kosovo or other on-going commitment, we decrease the number of available 39's to shoulder the day-to-day training commitments of the organization. While we are not advocating an unlimited supply of FA 39 officers, it is quite clear that the present strength cannot adequately meet the demands placed upon it. While FA 39 soldiers continue to do a lion's share of the work in the Kosovo's and Bosnia's of the world, our other commitments, training and otherwise, do not go away. So while it may appear we are meeting the needs of the Army against a manning requirement, this manning requirement is not based on an accurate assessment of the threat or commitments, be it training, real world or otherwise. Based on this assessment it is time to consider expanding the functional area. It is time we look at the threat and not the authorized positions, ours

is a business that must be dictated by the threat, and it is time to reevaluate our manning requirements.




Figure 5. AC versus RC (Total Force Structure Strength)

E. THE SF BLUEPRINT

To survive in an ever-changing operational environment, an organization must continuously find ways to evolve in order to refine its mission and skill set. This evolution prevents the atrophy of the organization. This section will use the formation of Special Forces Branch as a blueprint to illustrate such an evolution. By briefly examining how and why Special Forces became a branch, we intend to show how

the similar circumstances that today face Functional Area 39 warrant branch designation.

1. Background

U.S. Army Special Forces are an integral part of today's special operation forces that include Navy, Air Force, and other Army special units. As emphasized by Marquis (1997), "American special operators, like special operation forces throughout the world, have developed unique operational capabilities and missions that distinguish them from their conventional counterparts." (p. 7) Special Forces Branch was established as a basic branch of the Army on April 9, 1987. As a branch, Army SF is still in its youth, but as history shows, Army SF soldiers have played a vital role in the majority of the country's post World War II conflicts. History has demonstrated that Special Forces, like PSYOP and CA, has gone through patterns of build-up during a crisis followed by quick and drastic cuts at the conclusion of the conflict. This trend began with World War II and continued until the reorganization in 1986 (Marquez, 1997). This trend was arguably caused by the conventional mentality of the Army during the Cold War. It was further aggravated by a misunderstanding and mistrust of the capabilities and skills of the special operator. The misunderstanding came from trying to define and conduct

unconventional warfare by conventionally minded leaders. "Guerrilla warfare was not seen as an important method of warfare in its own right, as practitioners of an indecisive form of war, guerrillas could not prevail against professional, conventional armed forces. Therefore, there was no need for any highly specialized counter-guerrilla doctrine." (Adams, 1998, p.60) This mistrust was aggravated by the reputation (warranted or not) gained by Special Forces as sneaky 'snake eaters' and individualists who did not conform to proper military discipline and order. It was felt that Special Forces, as a subcomponent of the Army, should be treated as one more asset of the conventional army and not as if it were a unique force in its own right. (Adams, 1998, p.69) This behind-the-scenes conflict between Special Forces and the 'uniformed' conventional establishment would be a constant throughout the Cold War Era.

The roots of U.S. Army Special Forces can be traced to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); it was the OSS unconventional warfare mission that laid the foundation for today's Special Forces (Marquis, 1997). The first Special Forces unit - the 10th Special Forces Group was activated on June 19, 1952. The new unit fell under the newly activated Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC. This

organization was later renamed and divided in 1956 into a headquarters and a school and named the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center.

Army Special Forces saw limited action during the Korean War. As Adams (1998) explains, "Special Forces-trained officers were placed under the conventional Army command structure in Korea. While a few assisted the 8th Army's ad hoc and largely disorganized guerrilla warfare efforts (the training and assistance to the United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea), most were assigned as replacements in the regular Army divisions, where they had no notable impact on the war." (pp. 56-57) Despite the Korean War, the Soviet threat to Europe took priority. "Certainly, the focus of SF training was exclusively European, concentrating on the establishment of 'stay behind' teams expected to hide from Russian Forces and emerge in the enemy rear area to organize partisan resistance." (Adams, p. 56)

In November of 1953, the bulk of the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) was transferred to West Germany to prepare for resistance operations in case of war with the Soviet Union. The remaining SF troops stayed at Fort Bragg, NC and were reorganized as the 77th SFG.

Although there was a conventional focus throughout the 1950's to deter war in Europe, after the renaming and reorganization of training and headquarters elements in 1956, a renewal of interest occurred. In reaction to the rising power of communist China, the 1st SFG was activated in June 1957 and stationed in Okinawa. The 1st SFG was charged with providing Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to teach unconventional warfare tactics to cadres for or in Korea, the Philippines, the Republic of Vietnam, Taiwan, and Thailand. (Stewart, 1996, p.35)

The 1960s saw a rapid expansion of Special Forces. The decade started with the activation of the 1st Special Forces to oversee the three existing SF groups. The 77th SFG (A) was redesignated as the 7th SFG (A), and in 1961 the 5th SFG (A) was created with specific responsibility for the Republic of Vietnam. The election of John F. Kennedy as President in 1960 marked a change in military thinking. President Kennedy's concern with communist sponsored subversion and insurgencies in less developed countries led him to order the development of U.S counter guerrilla capabilities. With visibility provided by the White Star mobile training teams in Laos, and as the only U.S. force that could provide small, flexible, self-sufficient teams to counter these insurgencies, Special Forces became the force

of choice for the president's initiative on counterinsurgency. Special Forces, it was generally accepted, had been chosen by the president as the instrument to engage in the anti-communist efforts in Southeast Asia because of their military skills and self pro-claimed elite status (Adams, 1998). While this may have been true, just as important were the core skills - their language ability, area and cultural expertise, social and political knowledge - that the SF soldier brought to the battlefield. They were chosen as the force of choice for unconventional operations, based on their training in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Ironically, this ability would be lost as the Vietnam War dragged on and conventional means became the applied method.

The evolution toward a more conventional focus came about for two reasons, the loss of the Special Forces guardian with the death of President Kennedy, and the move by MACV to bring the Civilian Irregular Defense Force (CIDG) program back under military control from the CIA. After 1963, the initiative to keep US ground forces out by training indigenous forces gave way to a build-up of conventional forces to find the enemy and destroy it.

In 1964, Special Forces started the shift to more direct action missions versus the political-military activities they had previously performed. In 1965 the

decision to introduce large numbers of US troops was made and it became inevitable that a conventional military effort would become the dominant influence in Vietnam. "The emphasis on training Vietnamese Forces was lost. In its place was U.S. domination of the war effort and the belief that the war could be won by the application of overwhelming force." (Marquis, 1997, p. 17) Although Special Forces continued to be successful, the conventional mind-set sought to bring these elements under regimented parameters. What had started out as an effort to train and assist the Vietnamese in defending themselves in the early 60s, became a mission of supporting conventional units through direct action types of missions.

In the 1970s the Army's conventional combat doctrine was based on a notion of active defense. Under this concept, the utility of Special Operations Forces was nonexistent. The emphasis was on defending Europe from the Soviet threat with a large conventional force and nuclear weapons. Four of the seven active duty Army Special Forces Groups were deactivated between 1969 and 1974. Army Special Forces declined from a strength of 13,000 personnel in 1971 to less than 3,000 by 1974 (Adams, 1998). Special Forces came out of the Vietnam conflict with a bad reputation. The SF link to the CIA, which allowed them certain freedoms and

alienated them from conventional forces, the perceived special treatment given by President Kennedy, the allegations of immoral torture and assassinations during the war, the whole dogma of the Vietnam War as unconventional and wrong was laid on the soldiers of Special Forces. The reduction also brought initiatives by senior SF officers to 'play ball with the services'. In practice, that meant, "Special Forces would become part of the mainstream, shedding its 'independent' image in favor of being an accepted member of the 'combined arms team'." (Adams, 1998, p. 159) What was left of Special Forces concentrated on the conventional support missions of the regular armed forces such as direct action, reconnaissance and a reactionary force. "As far as the Department of Defense (DOD) was concerned, there was nothing very special about special ops and no dearth of units capable of unconventional missions. DOD officials testified before Congress in 1978 that a variety of conventional military units were capable of unconventional, especially counterterrorist, operations." (p. 163) By the end of the 1970s the ability of Special Forces to execute unconventional warfare or support conventional units was virtually nonexistence.

2. The Birth of Special Forces Branch

Although the focus remained on large-scale conventional

warfare with specific emphasis on the USSR as the probable enemy, it can be argued that the revival of Special Operations came about because of two reasons - the failed Iran hostage rescue mission in 1980 and the election of Ronald Regan as President. The inability of U.S. forces to rescue the hostages in Iran and the associated realization that the U.S. military had no trained 'special force' to counter terrorism or engage in the reversal of communist insurgencies around the world was a shock to the Reagan administration. Through initiatives such as the 'Reagan Doctrine', which focused on active versus passive means of supporting anti-Marxist insurgencies, and members of Congress taking a more active role in the development of a Special Operations command, Special Forces would become what it is today. In 1983, the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked the Special Warfare Center commandant to prepare an analysis of current and future needs for revitalizing Special Operations Forces (Stewart, 1996). Because of this analysis all Army SOF units (SF, Ranger, PSYOP, CA, Aviation) were put under the 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne). In the same year, TRADOC published a two-volume study, Low Intensity Conflict, which broadened the scope of low intensity conflict well beyond previous manuals. It analyzed

the use of diplomacy through guerrilla warfare, military assistance and insurgency within the spectrum of conflict.

The sign that a Special Forces Branch was on the horizon came in 1984 with the designation of a separate Career Management Field (18) for SF noncommissioned officers. The creation of the SF Warrant Officer Program (Military Occupational Specialty 180) and the recognition of SF as an officer career field (by making it Functional Area 18) were further signs of things to come. (Stewart, 1996)

A steady buildup of Special Operations Forces continued throughout the 1980s with the reactivation of the 1st SFG and 5th SFG. Doctrine on Low Intensity Conflict was updated, and the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provided the most far-reaching organizational change in special operations assets since the end of World War II. A new four-star unified Combatant Command was established to provide command and control for all Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF assets.

From its conception, Army Special Forces were able to be selective in the choosing of personnel. SF soldiers and officers were volunteers from other branches (mainly Infantry) who possessed skills that were vital to accomplishing the unconventional warfare mission. The

special operator had to be mature, physically and mentally fit, Airborne qualified, and efficient in basic military skills. Additionally, they also had to speak another language, be an expert in a occupational specialty such as operations and intelligence, engineering, weaponry, communications and medical aid, and above all had to have the ability to work as part of a team. An apparent problem during the late 1960s and throughout the reduction in the 1970s was the lack of a system or career branch to monitor the development and progression of the Special Forces soldiers and officers. While the enlisted personnel in SF were promoted and monitored within the Groups, exposure to the conventional mainstream was non-existent. Officers were still tracked within their basic branch, and as soon as they volunteered and were accepted into Special Forces, the stigma of being arrogant, independent, and nonconforming to normal conventional traditions became a black mark on there permanent records. Promotions and advancement were saved for those officers who bled conventional doctrine, not unconventional warfare. The first step of giving SF a Career Management Field for its enlisted and a functional area for its officers was instrumental in solidifying the commitment and loyalty of a occupational specialty that had vital skills to the national defense.

By making SF a branch in 1986, Special Forces was elevated and afforded the respect of a professional military branch. "The establishment of an officer career branch strengthened combat efficiency and the professional development of the SF leadership corps." (Stewart, 1996, p. 60) In 1987, the Department of the Army authorized the Crossed Arrows as the official insignia of SF. Like the Infantry, Armor or Artillery officer whose loyalty, military education, and advancement were linked to a respective branch, so now was the Special Forces officer. The branch designation also brought about a revamping of the selection process and the training program. Volunteers were now expected to go through a rigorous three-week Special Forces Selection and Assessment segment before attending the Qualification Course. This allowed the weeding out of unsuitable candidates at an early stage and, in the long run, strengthened the quality of the Special Forces branch.

From an analytical point of view, the ebb and flow in Special Forces from 1950 to the 1980s came from a requirement to have personnel trained in unconventional warfare. Unfortunately, the doctrine and the method by which these personnel were trained was misunderstood and not received well in a conventional environment. This conflict between Special Forces and the push by the conventional

establishment to control these assets and keep them in the conventional fold led to years of mistrust and misuse. It can be argued that by making SF a branch, both the conventional and special operators benefitted. Branch designation gave legitimacy and equality to the Special Forces and their skill set, while branch designation ensured that the special operators would have to play by conventional rules. No longer would the Special Forces operators be looked at as a nonconforming and arrogant individualist. It was now a professional branch with its own mission niche within the larger Army program.

3. The Similarities

PSYOP and CA, as established in Chapter I, have also seen periods of intense build-up followed by drastic cuts at the end of a conflict. The main similarity between the SF blueprint and the merits of making FA 39 a branch is its applicability to the operational environment. The need for specially trained soldiers was not (and is not) going to go away. SF reached a point in the 1980s that required it to take the next evolutionary step, branch designation. FA 39 has likewise reached this benchmark. Whether influenced by the threat environment, internal and external pressures or the need to change for the overall good of the organization, the logical step must be taken or the threat of atrophy due

to lack of innovative change will happen. The brief history of SF shows that their skills were consistently applicable. SF brought a particular niche to the table, one that could not be wished away or duplicated by conventional units. Thus, in the long run the organization had no other choice than to accept the special operators. Of course, by making SF conform to a more conventional role and eventually allowing them to evolve into a branch, the conventional establishment killed two birds with one stone. A special force that had a distinct set of missions and characteristics, but that was controlled and monitored like any other branch.

Like SF, the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was beneficial to PSYOP and CA assets in that it was a catalyst in developing Functional Area 39. Like SF, the skills that are provided by the PSYOP and CA community are regarded as important combat multipliers throughout the spectrum of conflict. Like SF, individuals selected as FA 39 operators must meet certain criteria, arguably not as rigid as SFs in certain capacities, but challenging enough in their own right.

Unlike SF, FA 39 is still seen as a specialty that an officer takes on for a number of years before returning to his basic branch. This is where FA 39 must take the next

step in its organizational evolution. Like SF, it must be afforded the opportunity to gain legitimacy amongst the other professional branches. If FA 39 is an indispensable commodity, then it should not be treated as an afterthought, especially when the operational environment specifically requires the skills provided by a PSYOP or CA operator.

F. POSSIBLE NON-RATIONALE BARRIERS

In this section we will explore the potential arguments that may pose resistance to making FA 39 a branch. These three arguments are: The Reserve Component Argument, the Funds Argument and the Concerned Stakeholder Argument. While the analysis is hypothetical and speculative, the reality of past organizational change in the Army has shown the reality of barriers.

1. The Reserve Component Argument

The question here is what would happen to USACAPOC and its command and control over active PSYOP and CA units if Functional Area 39 became a branch. The fact that the majority of PSYOP and CA forces are in the reserve component (approximately 90% combined, see Figure 5) justifies USACAPOC being commanded and staffed by a large majority of reserve officers. However, making Functional Area 39 a branch would challenge this arrangement. Like any other branch in the Army, the 39 branch would be the proponent for

training, doctrine, and professional development of its personnel. The branch would be commanded and staffed by active duty officers and enlisted. The question is not an inditement of the reserves or a suggestion that they are not capable of and/or not doing a fine job. Rather it broaches a topic that by its very political nature could be quite difficult and nasty to resolve.

The current operational environment finds PSYOP and CA operators deployed on a continuous basis. The disparity between reserve and active force dictates that to fill the requirements, the reserve component is continuously called upon to serve. No other organization in the Army operates this way, or relies so heavily upon the reserve component. Making FA 39 a branch would conceivably decrease the reserve workload by assuming the addition of personnel to the active force. This would in time decrease current reliance on the reserves, to some degree. Reservists may see this as good a thing, considering that by theory to be a reservist means the person has a civilian occupation. Others may not look so favorably upon the change because they remain on active status so much that the military is their job.

Historically, it could be argued that the need for PSYOP and CA has been minimal and only during major conflict have they become necessary. Perhaps this justified the need

for a strong reserve force with limited skills, overshadowing the requirement for a bigger active force. Times have changed, as deployment patterns over the past twenty years have proven. The old pattern has become obsolete as personnel with PSYOP and CA skills are in demand on a continuous basis -- a demand that does not wait for mobilization and predeployment training, but one that demands a ready force that can plan and deploy with a crisis reaction task force.

2. The Funds Argument

As in any change, the question of who will pay for it must be asked. In a period when reduction in forces and funds have become the norm, a change such as making a Functional Area 39 a branch would immediately raise the monetary flag. While this is a realistic argument and a rationale reaction, it warrants further research. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to research how much it would cost to make Functional Area 39 a branch, there are some questions that could be raised by further research on this topic. The main questions are: How much would it cost to make FA 39 a branch? Are we spending more money by relying on the reserve component? Would the potential long-term gain outweigh the potential long-term cost? If the threat determines where our efforts (money and personnel)

are applied - how much more money would be required? If the operational environment requires the deployment of PSYOP and CA assets, what is the difference in applying the funds to deploying an active component versus using funds to deploy a reserve component?

Chances are that turning Functional Area 39 into a Branch is not in the "too hard to do" category. As it stands now, the Army is paying both the active and reserve on a full time basis.

3. The Concerned Stakeholder Argument

The primary question in the stakeholder argument is the effect that making Functional Area 39 a branch would have on the rest of the Army. Would the precedent set by making FA 39 a branch create a slippery slope? Would other functional areas take this as license to argue for branch designation? If we apply the SF blueprint, Functional Area 39's bid for branch designation is legitimate because of the skill set they provide the combat commanders in the field and the threat environment: Skills that are considered 'muddy boots' versus technical specialties. FA 39 is the only functional area that falls under the operational career field designation. Furthermore, FA 39 is the only functional area with a reserve counterpart which is relied upon too much.

G. CONCLUSION

The intent of this chapter was to provide a logical argument that option four (Branch designation) is the best solution in the evolution of FA 39. Through thought provoking discussion, regarding FA 39 branch designation, we have provided issues that at the very least should produce critical thinking and further research into FA 39 development. By using the Special Forces Branch as an example, we have demonstrated that organizations must evolve when their skill sets are continuously required to counter the threat environment. The similarities between the SF and FA 39, in this respect, are remarkably similar. Finally, by addressing potential barriers to Functional Area 39 branch designation, we recognize that evolving is a scary proposition, however it is rational and doable. FA 39's time has come.

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